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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
7890

HOW_._:\_RD G. W ARLEN and
BARBARA M. W ARLEN,
Respondents.

BRIEF. OF RESPONDENTS

PRELIMINARY S·TATEMENT
The parties in this brief will be referred to as they
appeared in the lower eourt.
The Statement of F'acts as contained in plaintiff's
brief, pages 1 to 4, is accurate and the defendants have: no
additional facts to p·resent that would aid the Court in
deciding this case. Based on these· facts, the d~fendants
contend that the comp·utation of interest by plaintiff is in
excess of the maximum legal interest allowed under the
provisions of Section 7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
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The defendants contend in this brief that the trial
court did not err and that the judgment of the court
should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF' POINT'S
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
THE NOTE WAS USURIOUS.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
MAKE THE FINDINGS OF FACT AS PROPOSED BY PLAINTIFF.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
THE NOTE WAS USURIOUS.

The argument by plaintiff in Points 1, 2 and 3 of its
brief advances the theory that the trial court in determining whether the note· in this case was usurious need only
compute interest from the face of the note·, and if 26'% of
the face of said note leaves the amount which the defendants received in cash, then the note was not usurious.
In support of their contention, they have cited the case of
People's Finance ood Thrift Co. v. Varney, 75 Utah 355,
285 P. 304. This case is the only authority in.Utah that
has applied the language of an Industrial Loan Statute
to a, case- involving a defense of usury.
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In the Varney case defendants applied to plaintiff for
a loan in the sum of $200.00, said amount to be repaid
'Yithin ten months. The Industrial Loan Statute then in
effect prescribed as the maximum amount of interest 12%
per annum, and plaintiff therefore deducted 10% of
$200.00 as interest in advance, and the additional amount
of $2.00 investigating fee. The defendants· received the
sum of $178.00 in cash and executed a note payable to
plaintiff in the sum of $200.00. The defendants defaulted;
on the note, and upon suit by plaintiff, defended on the
grounds of usury. The defense of usury was based on
the ground that defendants did not have the use of $200.00
for a ten month period, and therefore the: total charge for
interest for the money.actually loaned to defendants was
in excess of 12% per annum. The Supreme Court, in
applying the language of the Industrial Loan Statute
to the facts, stated the following on page 305 :

"* * * When therefore the company deducted
12 per cent per annum as it did .on the face of
note, as interest in advance for the 10-month period on the loan, it but did what the statute expressly authorized such a company to do. The interest deducted was $20, which is the interest on
$200 for a period of ten months at the rate of 12
per cent per- annum. * * *"
The interesting distinction between the Varney case
and the case at bar is that in the Varney case, the amount
originally requested by defendants and the face of the
note is identical, while in the case at bar the amount requested by defendants and the face of the note is not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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identical. In the situation now before the Court where
the amount requested by the borrower and the face of the
note is not identical, the Court must determine upon which
figure the loan company is permitted to compute its interest. The defendants contend that this figure must be
f•the original amount requested, which in the case at bar
\would also be the actual amount received. If the lender
is required to compute the interest on this figure and then
includes this sum in the note, the lender will receive the
legal rate of interest on the "face of his loan."
If the face of the note is the figure upon which the
interest is to be computed, then the borrower is be·ing
charged for money upon which he neve-r received and
upon which he· should never be required to pay interest.
As stated in the case of McCall v. Herrirng, 42 S.E. 469, at
page 472, the court cited Webb in his treatise on usury
wherein Mr. Webb stated:

L

/\ " 'Interest is compensati?n for ~he use of
money. If the -amount of the Interest 1s deducted
: in advance, it is plain that the borrower neve·r uses
the interest so paid. He does not receive the full
amount of his loan. He cannot use that which he
was to receive unless it is paid to him. He cannot
employ money kept out of his possession. It renders the borrower no se-rvice, performs no pur\Pose, pays no debts, buys no property, satisfies no
· ·wants,· and accomplishes nothing, as far as the
borrower is concerned, for which he should be compelled to pay interest.'"
If the face of the note is the figure upon which ·the
inte-rest is to be computed, the lender is permitted to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

charge more than the law. ful rate of interest. In determining the rate of interest for a particular loan the case of
Agostini v. Colonial Trust Co., 36 A. 2d 33, presented a
formula. The court stated at page 36:
" 'The term 'interest' is a device of language
by which a formula is expressed in a word * * *
There are three elements in the formula and each
is essential to its proper application. The·y are:
The amount charged, the amount lent, and the
time involved. When each element has been accurately determined, application of the formula
to ascertain the rate of interest charged requires
merely the use of elementary arithmetic * *. *
" 'The amount lent means the exact sum of
which the borrower obtains the actual use. This
may not be the amount stated in the loan contract.
Any portion of that stated amount which does not
come to the borrower .ir~ec of. conditions wl,lich deprive hrm of his beneficial use cannot be included
in the amount lent for the purpose of computing
interest. One cannot properly pay for the use of
something of which one does not have the use * * *
" 'The time involved means the· exact period
for which the borrower has the free use of the
amount lent. Like rent paid for the use of property, the rate of charge for the use of money necessarily depends on the length of time it is used. The
amount of interest charge, in dollars and cents, is
not legally significant until the amount lent and
the time involved are known. Only when all three
factors are known can the rate of charge be computed and reduced to per cent per annum for comparison with the rate allowed by law.'"
~--· -~~---.L~--~~-
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Applying this formula to the case at bar, the amount
charged is $358.38; the amount lent is the sum of
$1,020.00, and the time involved is for a twenty-four
month period. Using simple arithmetic, the interest is
38% rather than the 26.% allo~ed under the statute.
There are other authorities that discuss the problem
of usury and the application of statutes that p-rescribed
maximum legal interest.
In Taylor v. Budd, (Cal.) 18 P. 2d 333, the plaintiffs
borrowed money from the defendants and executed a
promissory note for one year in the amount of $11,000.00
secured by a mortgage on real estate. The note contained
provisions for interest at 12% per annum payable monthly in advance. The plaintiffs received the sum of $10,670.00. The court, in discussing the question of interest
in advance and the question as to what should be the test
for usury, stated as follows, page 334:

:jl

'~

"* * * a note must be tested for usury with a
reference to the actual sum given by the lender to
the borrower and not by the mere face of the
note ; * * *."
In Co'YI!ner v. Minier (Cal.), 288 P. 23, defendant,
desiring to borrow the sum of $300.00 from plaintiff, after
executing two different notes and the plaintiff deducting
$1.50 for investigating fee, received $270.00 in cash. The·
defendant then defaulted and upon suit by plaintiff for
the sum of $300.00 defended on the· grounds of usury.
The case is not exactly in point because of the complicated
transaction, but the Court does discuss the problem of
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usury and the computation of interest. At page 25, the
court states :
"In the present case all the various papers'
which we have described are manifestly pa.rts of.
one transaction by which Minier borrowed money
from the company, and all must be taken into consideration to determine whether, that loan was
usurious. On consideration of them all, and of the
other facts stated, we have no doubt that it was.
Although Minier signed two notes for $300 each,
he actually received only $270, in addition to which
the company paid $1.50 for a financial report. At
the argument before us, it was stated that the deduction of $30 was made up of one year's interest
on $300 at 6 per cent, amounting to $18, * * *."
The court in discussing the difference b~tween the
$18.00 allowed as interest and the total deduction of $30.00
stated as follows, page 25 :

"* * * When interest or commission is deducted in advance from the amount of a loan, in
testing the transaction for usury, the principal
sum loaned will be held to be the face amount of
the loan less the interest or commission so deducted. Haines v. Commercial Mortgage-· Co.,
supra. The total amount loaned in this case, therefore, is $271.50."
I

Another authority is statement in 66 C.J. 210, which
states as follows:

"A contract or obligation for the :eayment of a\\·,.
sum of money larger than that actually lent to or ' ;
due from the debtor is usurious if the difference y ~
/
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between the face amount of the obligation and the
sum actually received or owed by the debtor, when
added to the interest, if any, stipulated in the contract exceeds the return permitted by law upon
'
. d or d ue, *· * * ."
the sum
actually so receive
Another case in point is McKanna v. Thorne (Okla.),
209 P. 1039. There, the· defendants borrowed from the
plaintiff the sum of $6,000.00 for a period of five years.
The maximum amount allowed under the statute was 10%.
The defendants were required to repay to the plaintiff
as interest on this $6,000.00 the sum of $3,454.15. The
court stated at page 1039·:
"It is clea.r from the notes executed by the defendants that the defendants contracted to pay to
the plaintiff $454.15 more than the legal rate of
interest, which the plaintiff was permitted to
charge the defendants under the law. Ten per cent
interest being the maximum amount of interest
which the plaintiff was permitted to charge the defendants for the use of the money, it is obvious
that, when the plaintiff required the defendants to
contract to pay him $3,454.15 for the use of $6,000.00 for five years, the transaction was tainted
with usury. The rule applicable to this case is
stated in Bristow v. Central State Bank (Old.
Sup.) 173 Pac. 221, as follows:
'When the lender exacts of the borrower
as a condition of the loan a sum in addition
to the highest legal rate of interest the loan
is thereby tainted with usury and the taint is
not removed. by giving this charge the· name
of 'discount'."
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case in point is Nevels v. Harris (Texas),
109 A.L.R. 146±, wherein a note was executed in the sum
of $6,400.00. It was to bear 10% interest from maturity.
There were other agreements entered into, but for the
purposes of this case, that point is not important. The
court states at page 1469:

"* * * Stolley took a note for $6,400, but he did
not lend that amount. He, in fact, only loaned $.6,±00 l~ss $320, or $6,080. We must therefore treat
the last-named figure as the real a1nount of_.the. __

~

~~.v.--,

The court goes on to state:

"* * * At 10 per cent, the highest legal rate,
the interest on $6,080 for one year would be $608,
and 10 per cent interest for the five-year period
the loan was to run would amount to $3,040. · This
sum added to the principal actually loaned, $6,080,
would aggregate $9,120. · This last sum is the
maximum amount Stolley could have· legally
charged, and unless the contract calls for the payment of more than that sum it is not usurious."
The Court will note from these authorities that the
primary problem in each case was a determination by the
court to see if the lender received more than the lawful
rate of interest. If the court so found, the court denounced the practice and held the instrument to be usurious, regardless of the manner or means by which it was
accomplished.
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In the case at bar the facts clearly show that plaintiff
received an amount in excess of the 26% allowed by the
statute, and therefore the note is usurious.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
MAKE THE FINDINGS OF FACT AS PROPOSED BY PLAINTIFF.

The argument by plaintiff in Point 4 of its brief is
p·resented to this Court as an excuse of plaintiff for the
execution of a usurious instrument. All authorities hold
that a necessary element of a usurious contract is an intent on the part of the lender to exact usurious interest.
A Utah case that is in point is the case of Cobb v. Hartenste:in, 152 P. 424, at page 427:
"* * *'In deciding whether any given transaction is usurious or not, the courts will disregard
the form which it may take, and look only to the
substance of the transaction in order to determine
whether all the requisites of usury are present.
These requisites are: (1) An unlawful intent;

* * *"
There is an additional rule that is equally established
and that rule is that if a not.e;is.. usnri;QlilB,·,~nn ~~~~..the
~equireq j;gJ~Jl~implied. In support of this, defendants direct the Court's attention to 55 Am. Jur. 348, and
further the case of Fagerberg v. Derntnry (Ariz.), 112 P. 2d
578, wherein the court stated at page 581 :
"* * * In order to establish usury there must
be an intent to violate the law. And while when the
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contract is usurious on its face that intent will be
presumed. \Vhen it is not, we think the circumstances surrounding the transaction are admissible
to show the true intent."
The Utah rase of Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, discusses this problem at page 430. The court states :.
~'*

* * As we have seen, by the statement of

the law quoted from Cyc. which we have adopted
in Flsher v. Adamson, supra, in order to establish
usury, the existence of an unlawful or corrupt
purpose is one of the essential elements which
must be clearly proved to exist at the time the
contract or transaction which it claims to be usurious is entered into. Where the contract upon its
face is usurious, the intention may be inferred an~
the inference may be so strong that no express denial can avoid the same."
Again the defendants assert that under the facts
presented in this case wherein defendants borrowed the
sum of. $1,020.00 and executed a note in the sum of
$1,378.38, this note is usurious on its face. The contract in
this case was made by plaintiff and it had knowledge qf
its contents and that it was exacting as interest 38% of
the amount loaned rather than the 26% allowed ~y
statute.
CONCLUSION
In analyzing the brief of the plaintiff, the plaintiff
has attempted to establish a new p~recedent in construing
usury statutes. The defendants assert that it would be
useless and a waste of this Court's time to cite authorities
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holding these statutes are to be strictly construed. The
statute involved is specific in stating that the amount of
interest is 1% per month and this loan being for twentyfour months, it is elementary that the total interest allowed is 24%. Plaintiff has attempted to convey to this
Court by its language and cases cited that this statute
was passed for plaintiff's protection itself and that this
Court should not construe the statute as a protection to
the borrower.
It is difficult for the defendants to conceive that the
legislature in passing the statute in question drafted a
bill that could be so tortured and misconstrued that a
lender could believe he could exact as interest more than
the legal rate of 1% per month.
This statute was passed to protect people from the
clutches of avaricious money lenders rather than throwing them to their mercy. The total amount of interest
that should be allowed for the use of $1,020.0~ is 26% and
not 38%.
The trial court held that the note sued upon by the
plaintiff was usurious, and the defendants herein contend
that the trial court's findings were correct and that the
judgment of said eourt should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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